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Book Review
Reviewed by Neil K. Evans*
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, by Jacob W.
Landynski. Johns-Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md. (1966). 286 pp. $8.50.
Jacob W. Landynski accurately sets forth in terse style the course
of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Since the author has
already been chided by Chief Justice Taft of the Ohio Supreme Court
for failing to recognize that the exclusion from evidence of items illegal-
ly seized undermines public confidence in the law,' further criticism on
that score, even if merited, would be redundant. For the same reason,
well-deserved plaudits2 and undeserved cant 3 need no repeating. The
following critical comments are made, with some trepidation, however,
because Landynski's work has already been sanctified by the citation of
Justice Brennan in the recent decision of Warden v. Hayden.4
Landynski's book is well worth reading for both laymen and general
practitioners. But for the more sophisticated student of the Court, the
book has certain, basic shortcomings. By largely limiting his study and
presentation to an analysis of the historical background and the cases
decided by the Court with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the author
excludes three areas of consideration which, as measured against prece-
dent, logic and symmetry, may be the prevailing influence on the course
of the Supreme Court's constitutional law decisions. Landynski does not
place the search and seizure decisions in perspective with other con-
temporary decisions by the Court in the human rights area; he fails to
analyze the search and seizure decisions in terms of the individual and
legal philosophies of the justices rendering them; and he does not view
such decisions as an exercise of power by a judicial institution whose
ultimate effectiveness depends upon the extent of faith vested in it by
the public. In short, Landynski's presentation unduly stresses the influ-
ences of precedent and logic rather than experience as the basis for de-
cision.5
* Of the law firm of Hahn, Loeser, Freedheim, Dean & Wellman, of Cleveland.
1 Taft, Book Review, 42 Notre Dame Law. 589, 592 (1967).
2 Ringel, Book Review, 12 New York L. F. 700 (1966).
3 McNally, Book Review, 12 South Dakota L. Rev. 167 (1967).
4 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1647 (1967).
5 Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular
result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been ex-
perience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
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Perhaps no more than Landynski has done can be expected in such
a compact work. If, however, other contemporary decisions of the Court
had been mentioned briefly, the particular significance and background
of the search and seizure problems would be better illuminated. For
example, in the same Term in which the Court rendered its fragmented
decision of Irvine v. California6 concerning the use in state court pro-
ceedings of items illegally seized by state officers, the Court unanimously
undertook to de-segregate the public schools.7 The Court's fragmentation
in Irvine8 attains particular significance when contrasted to the Court's
unanimity in the school segregation cases. Such contrasts are largely
missing in Landynski's work.
On the other hand, where Landynski does contrast the apparently
inconsistent decisions by an unanimous Court in Weeks v. United States9
and Adams v. New York, 10 he fails to point out that during the ten years
between such decisions, five new justices" had been appointed to the
Court. Likewise, Landynski's scholarly analysis of Boyd v. United
States12 and the Adams13 and Weeks 14 decisions in Chapters Two and
Three loses much of its significance when it is realized that these de-
cisions spanned twenty-eight years and involved twenty-two different
justices. None of the justices participated in all three decisions; only one
participated in the first two decisions,' 5 and only four participated in the
later two decisions. 16 Landynski may well have assumed that his readers
were fully aware of the changes of the membership of the Court and
their significance on the course of the Court's decisions. He may, there-
fore, be excused from focusing his attention on such mundane matters.
Landynski's failure to analyze the search and seizure decisions in
terms of the individual and legal philosophies of the justices must, how-
ever, be viewed in a different light. The most glaring distortion resulting
from such failure appears in the author's presentation of Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado.'7 Although Landynski
concedes that "the decision was based on considerations of federalism,
6 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
8 Supra note 6.
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
11 Hughes, Lamar, Lurton, Pitney and Van Devanter.
12 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13 Supra note 10.
14 Supra note 9.
15 Harlan.
16 Day, Holmes, McKenna and White.
17 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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the same considerations that are largely responsible for the prevailing
interpretation of the due process clause in a manner other than as a
synonym for the Bill of Rights," 18 Landynski fails to articulate, even in
a shorthand fashion, the basic precepts of federalism which Frankfurter
had, on so many occasions, advocated.
As early as 1928, Frankfurter had stated:
"Like all courts, the federal courts are instruments for securing
justice through law. But unlike most courts, they also serve a far-
reaching political function. They are a means, and an essential one,
for achieving the adjustments upon which the life of a federated
nation rests. The happy relation of states to nation-our abiding
political problem-is in no small measure dependent on the wisdom
with which the scope and limits of the federal courts are deter-
mined." 19
The "political" function of the Court was, in Frankfurter's mind, in-
evitably coupled with each substantive question before the Court. With
respect to the business of the Supreme Court in the 1934 term, Frank-
furter had written:
"While great changes have thus ensued during the course of a cen-
tury in the details for coping effectively with the vast changes in the
amount of business that has come to the Court, the essential con-
ditions remain the same under which the ultimate issues of federal-
ism-the distribution of power as between the nation and the states-
added to the ultimate issues of every government-the conflict be-
tween authority and liberty-are with us left for settlement by the
Supreme Court through the form of an ordinary lawsuit." 20
As Landynski points out, Frankfurter "saw the haunting specter of
the police state" back of each unlawful search. 21 Before his appointment
to the Court, Frankfurter had indicated that
.... anxiety over the deep shadows which crime casts upon the
American scene should not tempt relaxation of the moral restraints
which painful history has prescribed for law officers. Our own days
furnish solemn reminders that police and prosecutors and occasion-
ally even judges will, if allowed, employ illegality and yield to pas-
sion, with the same justification of furthering the public weal as their
predecessors relied upon for the brutalities of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 22
18 Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court, 127 (1966).
19 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State
Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q. 499, 500 (1928). (Emphasis added.)
20 Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934,
49 Harv. L. Rev. 68, 107 (1935).
21 Landynski, supra note 18.
22 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 95
(1931).
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Notwithstanding Frankfurter's deep concern with the problems of illegal
activities on the part of law enforcement agencies, he ruled, in Wolf v.
Colorado, that the rule excluding illegally seized items from evidence
was not then to be made applicable to the States. The basis for this ruling
is not found so much in Frankfurter's opinion as it is in his views con-
cerning the proper functioning of the Court in the federal system.
Frankfurter once stated:
For the very reason that accretions of the power of the central gov-
ernment and of national tribunals are inevitable, it becomes more
important than ever not to draw into the national authority matters,
which, on any basis of local sensitiveness and greater local com-
petence, can be wisely left to state authorities and to state courts.
23
Without making the reader aware of these views of Frankfurter, Lan-
dynski presents a distorted course of the Court's decisions with respect
to the adaptation to the States of the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Similarly, Landynski's failure to analyze other search and seizure de-
cisions in terms of the individual and legal philosophies of the justices
may well be regarded as one of the shortcomings of the work.
Landynski has also failed to view the search and seizure decisions
as an exercise of power by a judicial institution whose ultimate effec-
tiveness depends upon the extent of political faith vested in it by the
public. In the final instance, enforcement of the Court's decrees depends
almost exclusively upon the President. Congress also has almost un-
limited authority to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion. To maintain itself with such limitations as an effective tribunal for
the effective resolution of all cases and controversies, the Court must
foster faith for all of its rulings in the mind of the public.
The means by which public acceptance of its decisions is engendered
by the Court, differs greatly from simply following the election returns.
It requires first an application and determination of the vague concepts
of the Constitution so as to resolve finally the controversy before the
Court in accordance with the best legal and intellectual thinking of the
day and yet completely in step with all current economic and social de-
velopments. Secondly, it requires that the Court communicate its deter-
mination to the Bar and the general public in such a manner as to gain
respect for the Court and its rulings.
Although Landynski sets forth in Chapter Seven the problems of
illegal search, he fails to relate the criticism of the exclusionary rule of
evidence to the problem of the effective functioning of the Court as a
judicial institution. The difficulty of the search and seizure questions is
largely that they do not tend to "foster faith" in the Court as an institu-
tion in the mind of the public. This difficulty is not analyzed or evalu-
23 Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1932,
47 Harv. L. Rev. 245, 291 (1933).
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ated by Landynski as influencing the course of the Court's search and
seizure decisions.
Finally, it is to be noted and regretted that Landynski's work was
published prior to the search and seizure decisions by the Court at its
October Term, 1966,24 and likewise prior to the "stop and frisk" decisions
which are to be rendered at October Term, 1967.25 Although Landynski's
work unduly stresses precedent and logic rather than experience as the
predominant influence on the course of the Court's search and seizure de-
cisions, the book is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for the general practitioner and
well worth reading.
24 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (Dec. 12, 1966) (Planting of informer in coun-
cils of accused is not violative of Fourth Amendment); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (Dec. 12, 1966) (Use of tape recording of accused's private conversations as
evidence permitted where a court authorizes the wire tap to protect its procedures);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (Dec. 12, 1966) (Misrepresentation of identity
insufficient to constitute illegal intrusion into home under Fourth Amendment);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (Feb. 20, 1967) (Not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to search a vehicle held for use as evidence in forfeiture proceedings);
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (March 20, 1967) (Probable cause for arrest and
search exists when reliable informant tells police that accused is selling narcotics
in a general vicinity on the streets); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (May 29, 1967)
(No distinction between "mere evidence" and "fruits of crime" for purpose of Fourth
Amendment searches); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (June 5, 1967)
(Administrative inspections without warrant violate the Fourth Amendment), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (June 12, 1967) (New York State statute author-
izing wire taps violative of Fourth Amendment).
25 Sibron v. New York, U.S. S. Ct. Docket No. 1139 (October 6, 1966) (1966 Term)
probable jurisdiction noted, renumbered 63 (1967 Term); Peters v. New York, U.S.
S. Ct. Docket No. 1192 (October 10, 1966) (1966 Term) probable jurisdiction noted,
renumbered 74 (1967 Term) and Terry v. Ohio, U.S. S. Ct. Docket No. 1161 (March
18, 1967) (1966 Term) cert. granted, renumbered 67 (1967 Term).
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